ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

20
The debate about enhancing human traits has been raging for some decades, and more recently there consequences [1] [2] [3] . Others praise moral enhancement as an essential step in guaranteeing even the 27 2 very survival of the human race as the potential for doing great harm (e.g. with biological or other 28 weapons of mass destruction) continues to increase [4] [5] [6] [7] .
30
Although the debate is of recent date, 'moral enhancement' or 'moral bioenhancement' has already 
39
and offering answers, depend on assigning some sense or another to "moral enhancement."
40
However, clear and precise definitions of "moral enhancement" are not to be found; what has 41 been called "moral" enhancement ranges from feeling empathic concern to increasing personal 42 responsibility all the way to heightening respect for global fairness [8, p.3] 
44
And also: 45 anyone using the term 'moral enhancement' as if everyone knows what is meant must either 46 be simplifying matters to the point of negligence, or trying to speak only to those already in 47 local moral consensus. [8, p.4] 
49
We therefore believe that it is important to chart the different types of definition and so develop a 50 taxonomy of existing definitions or uses of the concept of moral enhancement. We focus on a number 
57
Of course, creating a descriptive taxonomy can only be a first step in the debate on moral 58 enhancement, as is clear from the quotes from Shook given above. Another issue that is rarely 59 acknowledged in the debate on moral enhancement, is that behind the seeming neutrality of defining 60 the concept, there often lie philosophical battles as to what constitutes morality and what it means to 61 act morally. In this paper we will therefore also discuss the (normative) implications of using certain 62 types of definition and of including or excluding certain elements from the definition. Our aim is to go 63 beyond the simplification and local moral consensus described by Shook above, to chart the 64 complexity of the concept and its implications for the normative debate on the permissibility or 65 desirability of specific interventions aimed at moral enhancement.
67
We believe a descriptive taxonomy, combined with a discussion of some of the main implications of 68 using certain types of definition, are important tools for anyone wishing to conduct a normative 69 analysis of the ethical desirability of moral enhancement. We will distinguish different definitions of 70 moral enhancement based on the criteria they use for determining whether a certain intervention is 71 indeed a moral enhancement. We each time focus on a single criterion whereby we discuss (1) 
76
Another element is that some definitions consider as moral enhancement those interventions that 77 change a person's moral behaviour while for other definitions an intervention can only be seen as a 78 moral enhancement when it targets a person's moral capacities. However, in this paper we will take no 79 position on the definitions or criteria we prefer or disagree with, and we will not formulate definitions 
96
Moral enhancement is not just the jacking up of virtue with neurochemicals. It is more broadly 97 taking conscious control of our lives to build the kind of character we want to have. [10, p.4] 
99
It will be clear that focusing on the intervention rather than on the individual allows consideration of 100 the efficacy of the intervention in particular cases to be deferred, and even that the nature of the moral 101 improvement becomes less central.
103
BROAD VERSUS MORE SPECIFIC INTERVENTIONAL MEANS
104
Another difference is that some authors [8; 11-13] use moral enhancement as a broad concept that 105 covers any practice that causes or is intended to cause a change in the functioning of moral capacities,
106
with types of interventions ranging from non-invasive (e.g. moral education) to highly invasive (e.g.
107
deep brain stimulation or brain surgery). Others [4, 14] 
149
such moral enhancement through genetic selection has been discussed by Walker [15] and Halley
150
Faust [19] . According to definitions such as the one mentioned above by Douglas, such a program of of morality argues that it is most plausible to depict moral processes as requiring the engagement of both emotional and cognitive neural networks) [29] .] However, 'moral capacities' might also be used to refer to those capacities one believes one should use when making moral decisions, or capacities that, when used more or better, would lead to better moral decisions.
These capacities might, for example, constitute the capacity for sympathy and fairness [9] or cognitive capacities [1] . 
428
This distinction is relevant since, for some authors, the goal of moral enhancement is for individuals to 
